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I. INTRODUCTION  
The changes brought about by the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) have prompted several scholars to call for 
a reconsideration of the efficiencies defense in healthcare mergers under 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act.  The ACA implemented several changes to 
increase quality of care that inherently incentivized entities to integrate.  
This integration, in theory, increases efficiencies and lowers costs.   After 
the ACA was passed, there was an upsurge of healthcare mergers.  
Recently, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and Department of 
Justice (“DOJ”) (collectively, the “Agencies”) have successfully challenged 
healthcare mergers for violating antitrust laws.1   These cases show a 
tension between antitrust law and ACA objectives.  One such case is St. 
Alphonsus Medical Center – Nampa, Inc.  v. St. Luke’s Health Systems (“St. 
Luke’s”),2 in which the defendant unsuccessfully argued that merger 
efficiencies would overcome the potential for the merger’s anticompetitive 
consequences.  The treatment of efficiencies in St. Luke’s has provoked a 
call to action from scholars, who argue for a reconsideration of the 
defense.   
Although some scholars argue for more expansive treatment of 
the efficiencies defense, this Article argues that courts are properly 
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1 In 2017, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia enjoined Aetna’s proposed 
acquisition of Humana and Anthem’s acquisition of Cigna.  See also Fed. Trade Comm’n 
v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 838 F.3d 327 (2016). 
2 778 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2014). 
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evaluating efficiencies in light of empirical data, the Agencies’ preliminary 
review of proposed mergers, and the existing burden-shifting framework 
that courts employ under the Clayton Act.  Section II of this Article 
provides an overview of the current state of healthcare consolidation.  
Section III explains how the courts currently apply Section 7 of the 
Clayton Act to antitrust matters involving healthcare mergers.  Section IV 
provides an overview of the St. Luke’s decision, which is critical to 
understanding the arguments for and against changing the courts’ 
treatment of efficiencies.  Section V presents scholarly arguments in favor 
of expanding the efficiencies defense in the analysis of healthcare mergers.  
Section VI counters that the efficiencies defense is properly limited by the 
courts.  Finally, Section VII of this Article concludes that the courts’ 
current standard is necessary to protect both competition and quality of 
health services. 
II. THE ACA, CONSOLIDATION & ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 
In 2010, Congress passed the ACA,3 vastly changing the landscape 
of the healthcare industry.  Although the ACA had several objectives, its 
overarching goal was to improve quality and efficiency of healthcare 
services.4  One way to achieve this goal was to transition from a fee-for-
service payment structure to value-based reimbursement.5  Pre-ACA, 
health systems predominantly operated under a fee-for-service structure, 
under which each service was reimbursed separately.6  This structure 
                                                     
 
3 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).  
4 See 124 Stat. 119, §§ 2717, 2718; Cory H. Howard, The Federal Trade Commission and Federal 
Courts' Scrutiny of Healthcare Mergers: Do Inflexible Standards and Increased Scrutiny Stifle the 
Legislative Intent of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act?,  18 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH 
L.J. 67, 69–70 (2015). 
5 124 Stat. 119, §§ 3001, 3006, 3007.  For a broad overview of value-based purchasing 
programs, see Bruce Fried & Jeremy Sherer, ValueBased Reimbursement: The Rock Thrown 
Into The Health Care Pond, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Jul. 8, 2016), https://www. 
healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20160708.055764/full/. 
6 124 Stat. 119, § 1115A(a)(2)(B); Fried & Sherer, supra note 5. 
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inherently incentivizes physicians to provide excessive care.7  In an effort 
to combat unnecessary care and expenditures, the ACA created value-
based payment systems, in which reimbursement depends on weighing 
health outcomes against overall costs.8  The transition to value-based 
purchasing “require[s] sophisticated management expertise and significant 
capital investments.”9  The push towards quality-based reimbursement 
thus encouraged entities to consolidate to provide more complete care. 
As part of the move towards value-based purchasing, the ACA created 
accountable care organizations (“ACOs”), networks of providers that 
work together to service 5,000 patients or more.10  ACOs are accountable 
for providing quality services to the population, and when they achieve 
their quality goals, they share in the savings they obtain through the ACA’s 
Medicare Shared Savings Program (“MSSP”).11  Because ACOs provided 
strong payment incentives for providers to create integrated, efficient 
networks, ACOs enhanced vertical consolidation, i.e. hospitals acquiring 
physician groups.12  After the ACA went into effect, market pressure to 
                                                     
 
7 Fried & Sherer, supra note 5. 
8 124 Stat. 119, §§ 3001, 3006. See also Thomas L. Greaney, The Tangled Web: Integration, 
Exclusivity, and Market Power in Provider Contracting, 14 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 59, 60 
(2014). 
9 3 HEALTH CARE 2020: CONSOLIDATION, HEALTHCARE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 
ASSOCIATION 2 (2016). 
10 124 Stat. 119, § 1899. 
11 Accountable Care Organizations, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES (May 
5, 2017), https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/ACO/. 
See also 124 Stat. 119, § 3022. 
12 Greaney, supra note 8, at 60.   While this article focuses on consolidation generally, it is 
important to note that ACOs pose special antitrust problems and have separate guidance 
from the Agencies.  The Agencies issued a policy statement creating safety zones for 
ACOs that meet safe harbors. See Fed. Trade Comm’n & Dep’t of Justice, Statement of 
Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care Organizations Participating 
in the Medicare Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,026 (Oct. 28, 2011).  ACOs 
with a common service and a market share of 30% of each common service are inside 
the safety zone and do not risk antitrust violations. Id. at 67,028. 
740          TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW          [Vol. 19 
cut expenses and improve quality further escalated the existing volume of 
mergers and acquisitions.13  This escalation continues as smaller entities 
merge with larger systems in an effort to maintain financial stability.14   
Before the ACA, there were roughly 1,113 hospital mergers 
between 1998 and 2012, averaging 74 per year.15  After the ACA passed, 
there was an uptick in consolidation within the industry.  In 2016, alone, 
102 hospital merger and purchase transactions were announced, an 
increase of 55% since 2010.16  The Agencies responded to this increase by 
bringing more enforcement actions.  In the wake of this “merger mania,” 
FTC Commissioner Brill clarified that “the ACA is not a free pass to avoid 
FTC regulation” and pointed out that antitrust enforcement is as crucial 
now as ever in facilitating healthcare markets.17  In reviewing antitrust 
actions concerning mergers under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, courts 
apply a burden-shifting framework.18  Several scholars argue that the 
courts’ treatment of efficiencies within this framework is at odds with 
ACA intent.  The interplay of antitrust and healthcare laws creates several 
                                                     
 
13 Molly Ebraheim, Antitrust and Hospital Mergers: Uniqueness and Consistency in Market 
Definition Analysis, 48 U. TOL. L. REV. 337, 337 (2017). 
14 Deloitte predicts that only 50% of the health systems operating in 2014 will be 
independent by 2024. The great consolidation: The potential for rapid consolidation of health systems, 
DELOITTE (2014), https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/life-sciences-and-health-
care/articles/great-consolidation-health-systems.html. 
15 Trendwatch Chartbook 2016: Trends Affecting Hospitals and Health Systems, AMERICAN 
HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION (2016), http://www.aha.org/research/reports/tw/chartbook/ 
index.shtml. 
16 Hospital Merger and Acquisition Activity Continues Upward Trend, According to Kaufman Hall 
Analysis, HEALTH SYSTEM MANAGEMENT (Jan. 24, 2017), http://health-system-
management.advanceweb.com/hospital-merger-and-acquisition-activity-continues-
upward-trend-according-to-kaufman-hall-analysis/. 
17 Lori Lustrin, Antitrust’s Attempt at Healthy Competition in Health Care, LAW360 (Mar. 23, 
2015), https://www.bilzin.com/we-think-big/insights/publications/2015/03/ 
antitrusts-attempt-at-healthy-competition-in-healt. 
18 United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 982 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
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questions about whether to change the courts’ analysis of efficiencies 
under Section 7.  
III. APPLICATION OF SECTION 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT TO 
MERGERS 
Before discussing the relevant arguments for change, it is first 
necessary to provide an overview of the standard courts use when 
assessing potential Clayton Act violations of merging entities.  Section 7 
of the Clayton Act prohibits a merger where the effect may be to 
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly.19  It is 
important to note that the plaintiff does not have to prove anticompetitive 
effects with certainty but rather that the merger has an appreciable danger 
of anticompetitive consequences.20  Presently, courts analyze mergers 
under a burden-shifting framework, in which the plaintiff has the initial 
burden to establish that the merger will produce “undue concentration in 
the market for a particular product in a particular geographic area.”21   
To satisfy this burden, the plaintiff must first define the relevant 
market, consisting of both the product market and geographic market.22  
Absent direct evidence of market power, market definition is important to 
the court’s analysis because it determines the defendant’s market share, 
thus aiding in the court’s assessment of an entity’s post-merger power.23  
To determine the product market, the plaintiff implements a hypothetical 
monopolist test to find reasonably interchangeable substitute products, if 
                                                     
 
19 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2018).  See also 2-9 Treatise on Health Care Law, § 9.04 (2017). 
20 United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 355 (1963). 
21 Baker Hughes, Inc.,908 F.2d at 982; FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 715 (D.C. Cir. 
2001) (quoting Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 363) (“[T]he government must show that 
the merger would produce ‘a firm controlling an undue percentage share of the relevant 
market, and [would] result[ ] in a significant increase in the concentration of firms in that 
market’”).  
22 United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 618 (1974). 
23 Phila Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 363. 
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any, that limit the hypothetical monopolist’s ability to implement a small 
but significant non-transitory increase in price.24  To determine the 
relevant geographic market, the plaintiff employs a similar test, looking to 
geographic alternatives where consumers may reasonably turn for the 
same products or services.25  
After defining the relevant market, the plaintiff determines the 
defendant’s market share along with the market share of other industry 
actors to show the potential power of the post-merger entity.26  A plaintiff 
can sometimes establish a prima facie case by relying solely on the 
defendant’s market share.27  The plaintiff determines industry 
concentration using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (“HHI”) Test, 
which is “calculated by summing the squares of the individual firms’ 
market shares,” thus giving proportional weight to larger market shares.28  
Mergers resulting in un-concentrated markets are unlikely to have adverse 
competitive effects.29  Under the Agencies’ 2010 Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines (the “Guidelines”), mergers resulting in highly concentrated 
markets involving an HHI increase by 100 to 200 points raise concerns, 
and HHI increases beyond 200 points are presumed to enhance market 
power.30  The plaintiff may also look to unilateral or coordinated effects 
of the firms.31  Unilateral effects arise where a merger diminishes 
competition, and the merged entity can unilaterally exercise market power 
                                                     
 
24 St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d at 784 (citing Theme Promotions, Inc. v. News Am. Mktg. FSI, 
546 F.3d 991, 1002 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
25Id. 
26 United States v. Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659, 664 (9th Cir. 1990). 
27 FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708 at 716 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Syufy Enters, 903 F.2d at 
664. 
28 St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d at 786. 
29 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE AND THE  FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES § 5.3 (2010) [hereinafter MERGER GUIDELINES]. 
30 Id.   
31 Id. at §§ 6–7. 
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in a variety of contexts, such as raising prices or suppressing output.32  
Coordinated effects, on the other hand, occur where a merger increases 
the probability that firms will coordinate their interactions in a way that 
harms customers.33   
Finally, the plaintiff may also look to barriers to entry.34  Ease of 
entry into a market may lessen some of the concerns that the post-merging 
entity will reduce competition in a given market.35  Entry into the market 
must be timely, likely, and sufficient to counteract the anticompetitive 
effects of a merger.36  If, after presentation of its case, the plaintiff satisfies 
its initial burden, there arises a presumption that the merger is 
anticompetitive.37  The burden then shifts to the defendant to rebut such 
presumption.38   
Defendants typically rely on a broad defense, using evidence 
showing that the market share statistics inaccurately account for the 
merger’s likely effects on competition.39  Defendants also commonly 
contest market definition, since it is integral in determining the defendant’s 
market share.40  Finally, defendants can argue that the merger produces 
                                                     
 
32 Id. at § 6. 
33 Id. at § 7. 
34 Id. at § 9. 
35 Id.; see also United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 532–33 (1973); Baker 
Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d at 987; Thomas L. Greaney & Douglas Ross, Navigating through the 
Fog of Vertical Merger Law: A Guide to Counselling Hospital-Physician Consolidation Under the 
Clayton Act, 91 WASH. L. REV. 199, 238–39 (2016). 
36 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 29, § 9. 
37 Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d at 983. 
38United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 631 (1974); Olin Corp. v. 
FTC, 986 F.2d 1295, 1305 (9th Cir. 1993); California v. Am. Stores Co., 872 F.2d 837, 
842 (9th Cir. 1989). 
39 United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963); United States v. Anthem, 
Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d 171, 192 (D.D.C. 2017). 
40 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 29, § 4. 
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efficiencies that overcome the potential for anticompetitive 
consequences.41   According to the Guidelines, “a primary benefit of 
mergers to the economy is their potential to generate significant 
efficiencies and thus enhance the merged firm’s ability and incentive to 
compete, which may result in lower prices, improved quality, enhanced 
service, or new products.”42  Merger efficiencies must be verifiable, 
merger-specific, and sufficient to show that the merger will not be 
anticompetitive.43  Courts have often ruled in favor of the merging parties 
because of the plaintiff’s failure to prove its prima facie case; however, 
once the presumption that the merger is anticompetitive is in place, 
efficiencies have never been sufficient through early 2018 to overcome 
it.44  The courts’ lack of robust analysis of healthcare efficiencies, in 
particular, has spawned some to argue for a clearer, reconsidered standard.  
For these scholars, the linchpin of their arguments is St. Luke’s.  
IV. OVERVIEW OF ST. LUKE’S 
In 2012, St. Luke’s, an emergency clinic in Nampa, sought to 
acquire Saltzer, the largest specialty physician group in Idaho.  St. 
Alphonsus, the only hospital in Nampa, unsuccessfully sought to enjoin 
the merger.45  After the district court denied St. Alphonsus’ preliminary 
injunction, the FTC and the state of Idaho intervened to enjoin the 
merger.  The district court found that the Clayton Act prohibited the 
merger,46 and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the ruling.47  The district court 
determined that the relevant product market consisted of adult primary 
                                                     
 
41 Id. § 10 (2010). 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d at 789. 
45 St. Alphonsus Med. Ctr. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181363, at 
*10–11. 
46 Id. 
47 St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d at 789. 
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care physician services, and that the city of Nampa was the relevant 
geographic market.48   
Central to the plaintiffs’ prima facie case was the post-merger HHI 
of 6,219 with an increase of 1,607, which was far above the Guidelines’ 
suggested thresholds for anticompetitive findings.49  The plaintiffs also 
pointed to the ability of the post-merger entity to negotiate higher 
reimbursement rates with insurers, which was ultimately harmful to 
consumers.50  Furthermore, the plaintiffs argued that entry into the market 
was historically difficult and would not be timely to counteract the 
anticompetitive effects of the acquisition.51  The Ninth Circuit upheld the 
district court’s finding that the plaintiffs presented enough evidence to 
obtain the presumption that the merger would be anticompetitive.52 
Upon rebuttal, St. Luke’s argued that the distinct procompetitive 
benefits of the merger were sufficient to overcome the plaintiffs’ case.53  
The Ninth Circuit was skeptical towards the use of the efficiencies 
defense, observing that the Supreme Court has never expressly approved 
of it.54  The court noted that four other circuits suggested that efficiencies 
could rebut a presumption of illegality.55  Of these circuits, however, none 
have found that the argued efficiencies were sufficient to overcome the 
plaintiff’s case.56  
                                                     
 
48 Id. at 784–86. 
49 Id. at 786 (citing ProMedica, 749 F.3d at 568). 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 787–88. 
52 Id. at 786.  
53 Id. at 788. 
54 Id. (citing Brown Shoe, Co., Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962)). 
55 Id. at 789. 
56 Id. 
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St. Luke’s urged that the merger comported with the goal of 
integrated care and risk-based reimbursement, which would provide cost 
savings and better care for consumers.57  St. Luke’s also argued that 
providing physicians access to St. Luke’s electronic medical records system 
would benefit patients.58  The court found that the defendant must clearly 
demonstrate that the merger enhance competition through efficiencies.59  
Further, in a highly concentrated market, proof of “extraordinary 
efficiencies” was necessary.60  Even though the district court conceded 
that the merger would improve the delivery of health care in Nampa, it 
held that efficiencies would not prevent the exercise of market power after 
the merger.61  Moreover, the court distinguished between the goal of 
moving toward integrated care and actually showing that such care was 
certain to result.62  Ultimately, the court held that St. Luke’s failed to show 
that the efficiencies rebutted the plaintiff’s case.63  After the St. Luke’s 
decision, there was an uptick in academia focusing on the efficiencies 
defense.   
V. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF EXPANDING THE EFFICIENCIES 
DEFENSE 
A. Expanding Efficiencies in Health Care 
The court’s treatment of efficiencies in St. Luke’s shows the 
tension between the ACA’s incentives to consolidate and enforcement of 
                                                     
 
57 Id. at 788. 
58 Id. at 791. 
59 Id. at 790 (citing United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121, 137 
(E.D.N.Y. 1997)). 
60 Id. (citing H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d at 720, 722). 
61 Id. at 791.  
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 791–92. 
2018]               ST. LUKE’S AND THE FAILURE OF THE EFFICIENCIES DEFENSE               747 
antitrust law.64  Case law indicates that efficiencies must be 
“extraordinary” to overcome a plaintiff’s prima facie case in highly 
concentrated markets.65  Using St. Luke’s and related cases, many scholars 
call for a change in the way courts analyze merger efficiencies in the 
healthcare sphere, contending that the Section 7 standard should be 
updated to reflect the current state of the industry.66  The court’s skeptical 
treatment of efficiencies in St. Luke’s is critical to this argument.  As 
Professors Blair, Durrance, and Sokol posit, “[t]he lack of economically 
informed case law in St. Luke’s is a missed opportunity to clarify merger 
law.”67  According to these professors, instead of implementing an 
empirical analysis of physician acquisition, the court abstained from 
engaging in a robust discussion of efficiencies.68    
Using St. Luke’s to demonstrate a lack of substantive analysis, 
scholars argue that guidance of the efficiencies defense would lead to 
consistent treatment by the courts and subsequently provide clarity for 
parties seeking to merge.69  To bolster the command for more expansive 
treatment of efficiencies, such scholars rely both on the quality component 
of healthcare mergers and the ACA’s incentives for health systems to 
consolidate. 
                                                     
 
64 Bernard W. Archbold, Analyzing Qualitative Efficiencies in the Ninth Circuit’s St. Luke’s 
Decision: A Defense of Non-Price, Qualitative Efficiencies, 27 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J. 343, 369 
(2017); Jamie L. Bjorklund, St. Alphonsus Medical Center v. St. Luke’s Health System: The 
Uncertain Application of the Efficiencies Defense is Leading to Unpredictable Outcomes in Healthcare 
Mergers, 53 IDAHO L. REV. 577, 610 (2017). 
65 St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d at 790. 
66 See Bjorklund, supra note 64, at 614; Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, Quality-Enhancing 
Merger Efficiencies, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1969, 1972 (2015); Ebraheim, supra note 13, at 359. 
67 Roger D. Blair, Christine Piette Durrance & D. Daniel Sokol, Hospital Mergers and 
Economic Efficiency, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2016). 
68 Id. at 38. 
69 Bjorklund, supra note 64, at 616–17; Blair, Durrance & Sokol, supra note 67, at 3. 
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B. Distinct Health Care Market & Quality 
Academia urging for stronger analysis of efficiencies hinges on the 
fact that quality is integral to the delivery of healthcare services, and 
mergers may enhance quality of care.70  Thus, courts should treat the 
antitrust analysis differently where healthcare mergers are at issue.  These 
scholars purport that health care is distinct from other industries, and 
lumping it with other commerce places too much emphasis on cost and 
not enough on quality.71  Currently, courts rarely identify quality as a 
substantive component of their analysis.72  In their study of the use of 
quality in antitrust cases, Professors Hammer and Sage found little 
evidence of courts using empirical quality considerations from healthcare 
research or literature.73  Their research concluded that the lack of quality 
analysis is due in part to a fragmented definition of quality.74  Antitrust law 
discusses quality in terms of the trade-offs with traditional price 
concerns.75  Conversely, “health care professionals tend to view quality as 
the outcome of a medical process . . . divorced from economic context.”76  
Because of the lack of clarity in quality analysis, “antitrust law often 
relegates quality and non-price considerations to a secondary position.”77 
Indeed, both the Agencies and courts lend greater weight and 
discussion to price, which according to Professors Blair and Sokol, 
“creat[es] a false distinction between price and quality” and discounts the 
                                                     
 
70 See Archbold, supra note 64, at 343–44; Blair, Durrance & Sokol, supra note 67, at 34–
39; Ebraheim, supra note 13, at 350. 
71 Ebraheim, supra note 13, at 363.  
72 Bjorklund, supra note 64, at 587; Peter J. Hammer & William M. Sage, Antitrust, Health 
Care Quality, and the Courts, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 545, 547 (2002). 
73 Hammer & Sage, supra note 72, at 609. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 556. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 547. 
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quality of care provided by the merged entity.78  Healthcare mergers, 
however, can produce non-price efficiencies such as “offering integrated 
care, tertiary care, more services, and better specialists,” which ultimately 
allow merging entities to be more competitive.79  Blair argues that “[f]irms 
compete on quality in health care as fiercely as they may on price,” and 
consumers take quality into consideration when deciding where to receive 
services.80  “Thus, when quality improves, consumers are willing to pay 
more for the same quantity of the good.”81  By this logic, even if a merger 
does not successfully bring down prices, the quality gained by way of the 
merger may be sufficient to render the merger procompetitive.   
These scholars contend that, to fully account for the quality 
advances of mergers, courts should lend more weight to quality via the 
efficiencies defense.82  Where courts discuss efficiencies, they do so in 
terms of price measurements and shy away from substantive quality 
discussions.83  Because of the lack of analytical framework for courts to 
discuss quality, uncertainty is perpetuated both for courts and businesses.84  
In her article, Kristin Madison argues that a measurable definition of 
quality will allow litigants to better support their arguments and will 
                                                     
 
78 Blair & Sokol, supra note 66, at 1971; see also Bjorklund, supra note 64, at 580. 
79 Bjorklund, supra note 64, at 615. 
80 Blair, Durrance & Sokol, supra note 67, at 44. 
81 Blair & Sokol, supra note 66, at 1975. 
82 Bjorklund, supra note 64, at 615. 
83 See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 852 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1093 (N.D. Ill. 
2012) (discussing cost-based efficiencies and finding that any proposed quality-based 
efficiencies are wholly speculative); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Tenet Healthcare, 17 F. Supp. 
2d 937, 948 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (finding that cost-based efficiencies are speculative); Fed. 
Trade Comm’n v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1307 (W.D. Mich. 1996) 
(providing weight to cost-based efficiencies); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Freeman Hosp., 911 
F. Supp. 1213, 1224 (W.D. Mo. 1995) (discussing efficiencies in terms of economies 
reducing administrative and overhead costs).  
84 Bjorklund, supra note 64, at 580; Blair, Durrance & Sokol, supra note 67, at 70. 
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provide certainty to businesses anticipating consolidation.85  According to 
the preceding arguments, courts should lend more weight to quality 
analysis to account for merger efficiencies.86  Such discussion will provide 
guidance in the business world87 and will bring antitrust law and the ACA 
into alignment.88 
C. ACA & Incentives to Consolidate 
Other scholars look to the ACA itself as affirmation that a more 
flexible standard should govern healthcare consolidation.89  The ACA 
sought to mitigate the problems accompanying a fragmented system of 
health services and to improve overall access and quality.90  Some scholars 
argue that the ACA specifically envisioned consolidation91 as a means to 
                                                     
 
85 Kristin Madison, Hospital Mergers in an Era of Quality Improvement, 7 Hous. J. Health L. 
& Pol’y 265, 298–99 (2007). 
86 See generally Archbold, supra note 64, at 372; Bjorklund, supra note 64, at 615; Blair & 
Sokol, supra note 66, at 1984; Ebraheim, supra note 13, at 360–63. 
87 See Archbold, supra note 64, at 374; Bjorklund, supra note 64, at 581 (arguing for a 
“certain and consistent application of the efficiencies defense” to “provid[e] a framework 
for healthcare entities seeking to merge”); Blair & Sokol, supra note 66, at 1995 (arguing 
that a more robust analysis of quality would help improve business planning). 
88 See Bjorklund, supra note 64, at 618 (“[r]eexamining how healthcare mergers will be 
assessed will bring antitrust law into accord with current healthcare policy . . . ”). 
89 See, e.g., Erin C. Fuse Brown & Jaime S. King, The Double-Edged Sword of Health Care 
Integration: Consolidation and Cost Control, 92 IND. L.J. 55, 62–63 (2016); Howard, supra note 
4, at 83–86; Leigh L. Oliver & Robert F. Leibenluft, A Mixed Bag: Sorting out Efficiencies 
Arguments in Hospital Mergers, 30 ANTITRUST ABA 18, 18 (2015). 
90 Greaney, supra note 8, at 60. 
91 See The State of Competition in the Health Care Marketplace: The Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act’s Impact on Competition, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, Commercial 
and Antitrust Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary H.R., 114th Cong. 82 (2015) (statement of 
Scott Gottlieb, M.D., Resident Fellow, American Enterprise Institute); Terry L. Corbett, 
Healthcare Corporate Structure and the ACA: A Need for Mission Primacy Through a New 
Organizational Paradigm?, 12 IND. HEALTH. L. REV. 103, 150–51 (2015); Greaney, supra 
note 8, at 60; Marshall B. Kapp, Speculating about the Impact of Healthcare Industry Consolidation 
on Long-Term Services and Supports, 25 Annals Health L. 1, 5 (2016). 
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alleviate these problems by bringing down costs and aligning provider 
incentives.92  In his article on hospitals and antitrust scrutiny, Ross Bautista 
went so far as to claim that integration is the best way to “reduce 
fragmentation, increase efficiency, and thus [to] reduce costs.”93 
Specific consolidation drivers from the ACA include the move to 
value-based purchasing,94 which encompasses the creation of ACOs, as 
previously discussed.  The ACO program is the most explicit example of 
the ACA incentivizing entities to integrate.  ACOs, by definition, involve 
multiple entities coming together for the purpose of delivering more 
efficient care.95  Vertical integration theoretically achieves the ACA’s cost-
saving goals.96  More importantly, such integration could provide the 
coordinated care that the healthcare system lacks.97  Professor Thomas 
Greaney pushes back against this argument, arguing that no part of the 
                                                     
 
92 Blair, Durrance & Sokol, supra note 67, at 23–24. 
93 Ross E. Bautista, The Never-Ending Quest for Clarity Amidst Uncertainty: Hospital M&A and 
Antitrust Scrutiny, 54 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 149, 156 (2017). 
94 HEALTH CARE 2020, supra note 9. See also Jacqueline Belliveau, Value-Based Care, Price 
Transparency Drive Hospital Mergers, REVCYCLE (Dec. 6, 2016), https:// 
revcycleintelligence.com/news/value-based-care-price-transparency-drive-hospital-
mergers.  
95 124 Stat. 119, § 1899. ACOs are networks of health care providers that work together 
to provide health services to at least 5,000 patients for at least 3 years.  ACOs agree to be 
held accountable for providing quality services, and they share in the cost savings they 
achieve. Id. 
96 Kapp, supra note 91, at 12. 
97 Id. 
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ACA explicitly encourages such integration.98  Greaney calls these 
scholars’ arguments the “ACA-made-me-do-it defense.”99 
Nevertheless, the proponents of expanded efficiencies analysis 
turn to the ACA as the primary source of legislative intent to encourage 
mergers for the purpose of increasing efficiencies within the industry.100  
According to these arguments, not only do mergers and acquisitions have 
the potential to increase quality, but they can also achieve important cost 
savings.101  Finally, scholars argue that integration is vital to achieving the 
ACA’s quality and cost-savings goals.102  Given the ACA’s efficiency 
incentives, these arguments refute a restricted standard that fails to fully 
account for both quality and cost components of the efficiencies defense. 
VI.  ARGUMENTS FOR CONSTRAINING EFFICIENCIES 
Despite the preceding arguments for robust and favorable analysis 
of the efficiencies defense, courts are properly analyzing efficiencies for a 
variety of reasons.  First, such arguments omit discussion of the potential 
dangers of healthcare mergers to exclude rivals and to circumvent self-
referral legislation.  In addition, merged entities within the healthcare 
system typically gain market power and the ability to exploit prices.  
Moreover, empirical research on integrated health systems has consistently 
                                                     
 
98 The State of Competition in the Health Care Marketplace: The Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act’s Impact on Competition, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, Commercial 
and Antitrust Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary H.R., 114th Cong. 23 (2015) (statement of 
Thomas L. Greaney, Professor of Law, St. Louis University School of Law). 
99 Id. In Greaney’s view, the ACA sought to improve market competition by establishing 
health insurance exchanges to facilitate consumer comparison shopping and by requiring 
the insurance companies to maintain a minimum level of coverage. Id. at 18–20.  
Furthermore, the provider incentives promulgated by the ACA rely on competition “to 
drive cost containment and quality improvement.” Id. 
100 See Archbold, supra note 64, at 369.  
101 See, e.g., Archbold, supra note 64, at 344; Bjorklund, supra note 64, at 583; Ebraheim, 
supra note 13, at 350. 
102 See Corbett, supra note 91, at 159; Kapp, supra note 91, at 13–14. 
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found that consolidation does not enhance quality of care.  Finally, 
scholars who argue for more expansive treatment of the efficiencies 
defense inflate the degree to which the Agencies attack mergers in the 
healthcare industry.  For these reasons explored below, courts are properly 
construing the efficiencies defense.  
A. Potential for Exclusion of Rivals & Facilitation of Referrals 
First, courts are correctly giving limited analysis to the efficiencies 
defense because of the potential dangers healthcare mergers pose, 
including facilitation of referrals, foreclosure of competition, and raising 
of prices above competitive levels.103  These harms are exacerbated when 
there are high entry barriers and where mergers occur in highly 
concentrated markets, as is often the case in hospital markets.104  In the 
healthcare setting, the potential for such dangers is further amplified by 
other factors, such as bundling hospital and physician services, as in St. 
Luke’s.  Such merger harms complicate healthcare marketplaces in several 
ways.   
First, integrating physician groups within a larger hospital system 
facilitates the referrals of patients within a single network.105  When 
hospitals contract directly with physicians, they may use the relationship 
to “increase admissions, diagnostic testing, and outpatient services at their 
                                                     
 
103 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 29, at §§ 1–2. See also Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 
323–24 (finding that the foremost “vice” of a vertical merger is “foreclosing the 
competitors of either party from a segment of the market . . .”). For a thorough 
explanation of foreclosure via mergers, see Greaney & Ross, supra note 35, at 216, 221, 
226. 
104 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 29, §§ 5.3, 9. See also David M. Cutler & Fiona Scott 
Morton, Hospitals, Market Share, and Consolidation, 310 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1964, 1966 
(2013).   
105 Brown & King, supra note 89, at 72–73. 
754          TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW          [Vol. 19 
facilities.”106  Such referrals allow physicians to skirt the Anti-Kickback 
Statute107 and the Stark Law,108 two regulatory safeguards against self-
referrals.109  These laws “afford broad leeway with regard to referrals by 
employed physicians,” which makes it easier for integrated health systems 
to circumvent the statutes’ prohibitions.110  Such referrals also have the 
ability to foreclose competitors from obtaining patients within the 
market.111  Physician practices owned by larger networks therefore have 
the competitive edge over independent groups that must fight to bring in 
patients.   
 Second, large entities post-merger may foreclose competition and 
subsequently raise prices above competitive levels.112  This danger is 
amplified in the healthcare setting, where marketplaces are already 
concentrated.113   A study by David Cutler and Fiona Morton of hospital 
market share and consolidation found that, in 2010, half of all hospital 
markets were highly concentrated.114  Another third were moderately 
                                                     
 
106 Laurence C. Baker, M. Kate Bundorf & Daniel P. Kessler, Vertical Integration: Hospital 
Ownership of Physician Practices is Associated with Higher Prices and Spending, HEALTH AFFAIRS, 
May 2014, https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/pdf/10.1377/hlthaff. 2013.1279. 
107 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2018). The Anti-Kickback Statute provides criminal liability for 
an individual or entity that solicits or receives remuneration in return for or to induce 
referrals or services reimbursable by the federal government. Id. 
108 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2018). The Stark Law prohibits a physician from referring to an 
entity for a designated health service if the physician has a financial relationship with that 
entity. Id.  
109 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b)–(e). 
110 Greaney & Ross, supra note 35, at 212; see 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b)–(e) (providing 
exceptions to liability, including those for employees and for hospital ownership); see also 
Brown & King, supra note 89, at 72–73. 
111 Blair, Durrance & Sokol, supra note 67, at 28. 
112 See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 29, §§ 6–7. 
113 See Cutler & Morton, supra note 104. 
114 Id. Cutler & Morton examined data from the American Hospital Association, focusing 
on “nonfederal, short-term general and specialty hospitals that have facilities and services 
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concentrated, leaving only the remaining sixth un-concentrated.115  This 
concentration allows a dominating entity to wield market power and raise 
prices, as discussed below in Subsection B.  Furthermore, because of the 
power of integrated systems, physician groups are increasingly integrating 
within larger systems to maintain financial stability and to gain leverage 
against insurance companies.116  Folding to the power of larger health 
systems further adds to market concentration, causing less competition in 
the overall marketplace and allowing the larger systems to maintain market 
power against remaining independent groups.  Where there is appreciable 
danger for anticompetitive consequences, courts properly impose a high 
burden on defendants to defeat a presumption that a merger is 
anticompetitive.  Courts should therefore refrain from expanding the 
efficiencies defense.  
B. Market Power & Price Increases 
Another danger of consolidation that rebuts scholars’ argument 
for merger efficiencies is that the merged entity can charge higher prices 
by gaining bargaining leverage over insurance companies to demand 
higher reimbursement rates.117  Studies show that hospital networks have 
stronger leverage than any provider groups because of their size and 
patient volume, and so-called “must have” hospitals charge higher prices 
than other hospitals within the same marketplace.118  Ostensibly, 
countervailing the power of insurers is beneficial to the overall hospital 
market; however, when the market becomes dominated by a large 
                                                     
 
available to the public.” Id. at 1964.  They analyzed market information from 306 hospital 
referral regions across the county. Id. Cutler and Morton turned to share of admissions 
and HHI to discuss the competitive market of the regions. Id. 
115 Id. at 1966. 
116 See Baker, Bundorf & Kessler, supra note 106. 
117 Id. at 757. 
118 Chapin White, Amelia Bond, & James Reschovsky, High and Varying Prices for Privately 
Insured Patients Underscore Hospital Market Power, 27 CENTER FOR STUDYING HEALTH 
SYSTEM CHANGE 4 (Sept. 2013). 
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integrated system, that system alone has the ability to charge higher prices, 
and independent hospitals and provider groups in the same market have 
no leverage to command the same.119  The disjointed power thus causes 
wide price variations amongst the prices insurers pay hospitals.120   
A study conducted by Chapin White showed as much as a 60% 
variation between the prices insurers pay to the most- and the least-
expensive hospitals in a given market.121  The study further found that 
such differences were not attributable to labor costs, complexity of 
services, type of coverage, or whether the hospital had teaching 
programs.122  According to the study, such variation resulted from market 
                                                     
 
119 Jennifer R. Conners, A Critical Misdiagnosis: How Courts Underestimate the Anticompetitive 
Implications of Hospital Mergers, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 543, 553 (2003). 
120 See generally White, Bond, & Reschovsky, supra note 118. 
121 Id. at 2. For comparison, the study found little variation amongst primary care 
physician prices.  This lack of variation correlates with the lack of market power primary 
care physicians possess.  Physicians traditionally operate under solo or small group 
practices, and they are therefore more “substitutable” to the insurance companies. Id. at 
3. 
122 Id. Massachusetts Attorney General also concluded similar results in a state-wide study 
committed to determining the causes of price variation. MASS. ATT’Y GEN., REP. FOR 
ANNUAL PUBLIC HEARING UNDER G.L. C. 118G, § 6½(B) (2010).  In the report, the AG 
found that prices paid by health insurers to hospitals and physician groups varied 
significantly within the same geographic area and amongst providers that offered similar 
service. Id. at 3.  Further, these variations were not attributable to the quality of care 
provided, the sickness of the population, the complexity of services, how many patients 
relied on Medicare or Medicaid, or whether the provider was in an academic facility. Id. 
The study concluded that price variations correlated to market leverage. Id. at 4. A similar 
study was conducted by T. Scott Thompson in California, where concentration and 
insurance premiums varied considerably amongst the regional divides. See generally T. 
Scott Thompson, ACA Exchange Premiums and Hospital Concentration in California, 
ANTITRUST HEALTH CARE CHRONICLE 27 (Jan. 2015).  Thompson concluded that there 
was a clear positive relationship between insurance premiums and HHI increases. Id. at 
30.  Importantly, the least concentrated areas that had more than 5 competitors in the 
region had lower average premiums. Id. 
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power.123  Another study found that hospital prices in monopoly markets 
were more than 15% higher than in areas with four or more 
competitors.124  Statewide studies of hospital systems also find a positive 
correlation between market power and price increases.125   
Research further supports that patients ultimately bear the cost of 
these higher rates.126  A study conducted by Professor Jeff Goldsmith on 
health care integrated delivery networks found that per patient 
expenditures in hospital systems and multihospital systems are 10-20% 
higher than in independent groups, which adds up to $1,200-$1,700 more 
per patient, per year.127  Prices increases are particularly dangerous when a 
merger-to-monopoly occurs, eliminating all competition in a given market.  
The cost of an inpatient stay at a hospital in a monopoly market is $1,900 
higher than markets with four or more competitors.128  Given the 
extensive data supporting price variation and market power, “[p]roposed 
hospital consolidation should be scrutinized carefully to ensure that 
competition is protected and that patients and payors are unlikely to suffer 
from price increases.”129 
C. Consolidation Does Not Lead to Quality Improvement 
Another reason to maintain skepticism of the efficiencies defense 
is that there is little empirical evidence that consolidation actually enhances 
quality of care, as merging parties often argue.  According to the DOJ, 
                                                     
 
123 White, Bond, & Reschovsky, supra note 118, at 3. 
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REVCYCLE INTELLIGENCE (May 24, 2016), https://revcycleintelligence.com/news/ftc-
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125 See, e.g., Mass. AG, supra note 122; T. Scott Thompson, supra note 122. 
126 See Jeff Goldsmith, et al., Integrated Delivery Networks: In Search of Benefits and Market 
Effects, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SOCIAL INSURANCE 27–28 (Feb. 2015). 
127 Id. at 12. 
128 Sampson, supra note 124(quoting Edith Ramirez, F.T.C. Chair). 
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“most studies find that increased hospital concentration is associated with 
increased prices.”130  Furthermore, “[e]ven if a hospital merger is likely to 
create cognizable efficiencies, those cognizable efficiencies likely will not 
be sufficient to reverse a hospital merger’s potential to harm consumers 
in the relevant market.”131   
A growing number of studies suggest that integration has little 
bearing on quality and instead leads to increased expenditures for 
patients.132  According to the Goldsmith study, there is “scant evidence in 
the literature of either societal benefits or advantages accruing to providers 
from [integrated delivery network] formation.”133  Conversely, “there is 
growing evidence that hospital-physician integration has raised physician 
costs, hospital prices and per capita medical care spending.”134  Moreover, 
hospital mergers have the potential to lower the quality of care, because 
lack of competition obviates hospitals’ incentives to innovate and compete 
over the non-price elements of patient care.135  These findings do not 
suggest that quality is a key component of healthcare consolidation, but 
                                                     
 
130 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE AND F.T.C., IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A DOSE OF 
COMPETITION-Report by F.T.C and U.S. Dep’t of Justice (June 25, 2015) (discussing that 
some studies find that merged parties have lower costs, and how one study in particular 
found that cost savings varies depending on the extent of consolidation). 
131 Id. 
132 Data Brief, Impact of Hospital Consolidation on Health Insurance Premiums, AMERICA’S 
HEALTH INSURANCE PLANS 2 (June 2015), https://www.ahip.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2015/06/ProviderConsolidation_DataBrief_6.25.15.pdf. See also Marina Lao, 
Francine Lafontaine, & Debbie Feinstein, Not just an opinion: competition really is key to healthy 
health care markets, F.T.C. (Jul. 8, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/ 
blogs/competition-matters/2015/07/not-just-opinion-competition-really-key-healthy-
health. 
133 Goldsmith, et al., supra note 126, at 2. 
134 Id. According to the data, integrated delivery systems’ flagship hospital services are 
more expensive on two levels: on a cost-per-case basis as well as a total-cost-of-care basis 
than the services of their most significant in-market competitor. Id at 27–28. 
135 Conners, supra note 119, at 549–50. 
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rather that market power and removal of competition primarily motivates 
such consolidation.136 
Other studies also find no measurable correlation between price 
and quality.137  A report to Congress from the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) concludes that price increases 
do not indicate quality advancements.138  According to the OECD, the 
U.S. spends more on health care than any of the other 33 member 
countries of the OECD.139  Despite such spending, the U.S. lags behind 
other countries in numerous quality measures.  For example, the U.S. 
ranks 26th in life expectancy and 31st in infant survival rates.140  Although 
the quality of care has steadily increased in the U.S., it does so at a slower 
pace than the other OECD countries.141  Edith Ramirez, the FTC Chair, 
proposed that competition is essential to quality of care, because hospitals 
compete to attract patients, and such competition leads to better price and 
quality benefits for consumers.142  Thus, competition, not consolidation, 
leads to cost and quality benefits for consumers.  Taken together, this 
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137 See Examining Consolidation in the Health Insurance Industry and its Impact on Consumers: 
Hearing Before Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy & Consumer Rights of the Subcomm. on 
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research suggests that rigorous enforcement of antitrust laws is crucial in 
maintaining healthcare quality. 
D. Scholars Inflate Degree of Merger Scrutiny 
Finally, scholars arguing for expanded analysis of efficiencies fail 
to take into account that the Agencies conduct an extensive multi-step 
review before bringing suit.143  After such review, the vast majority of 
mergers may proceed.144  In 2016, 1,832 transactions were reported to the 
Agencies.145  Of these transactions, the Agencies brought challenges to 47, 
or 2%.146  This percentage suggests that the Agencies only brings 
enforcement actions to mergers that have an appreciable danger of being 
anticompetitive.  Moreover, the Agencies have the ability to examine 
merger efficiencies during the review and can abstain from challenging the 
merger if they find that such efficiencies would overcome the potential for 
anticompetitive consequences.   
Furthermore, scholarly arguments do not discuss the placement of 
the efficiencies defense within the broader burden-shifting framework 
required by Section 7 of the Clayton Act.  The current standard is such 
that the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of persuasion.147  The plaintiff 
has the onus to first obtain a presumption of anticompetitive harm.   The 
efficiencies defense comes into play only after the plaintiff makes a prima 
facie showing that the merger is likely to be anticompetitive.148  Therefore, 
once efficiencies are argued, there is already a strong likelihood of 
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anticompetitive consequences, and the defendant should have a high 
burden of proof to rebut this presumption.  Finally, for efficiencies to 
succeed, they must be merger-specific, meaning that they cannot be 
possible absent the merger.149  This barrier ensures that parties do not 
abuse their reliance on quality to justify otherwise anticompetitive 
mergers.  For these reasons, there is a strong argument to constrain the 
use of the efficiencies defense. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The healthcare industry has undergone substantial change since 
the ACA was passed.  The high level of consolidation within the industry 
and the subsequent lack of flexibility from the courts is a source of 
frustration for scholars seeking to overcome obstacles to quality 
improvement.  Given the high concentration of the market and the 
potential anticompetitive dangers of mergers,150 it follows that courts are 
properly constraining the efficiencies defense in favor of protecting 
consumers from powerful entities.  Restricting the use of the efficiencies 
defense follows the empirical evidence, which shows that consolidation 
tends to increase costs and has little bearing on quality.  Despite 
proponents’ arguments for expanding the use of efficiencies, courts 
should maintain the current standard following the proposition that 
competition is the best means to achieving low costs and high quality of 
care. 
                                                     
 
149 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 29, at § 10; St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d at 790–91. 
150 According to the Health Care Cost Institute, in 2017, the average hospital and system 
HHIs were 1,984 and 2,969, respectively. Healthy Marketplace Index: Hospital Concentration 
Index, HEALTH CARE COST INST. 2 (2017).  “The higher system-level HHIs imply that 
inpatient services are more concentrated at the system level than the hospital level.” Id. 
